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EXIT TRACKING: SHOULD THE FEDERAL 
GOVERNMENT TRACK NONCITIZENS’ 
DEPARTURES FROM THE UNITED STATES?
By Mark StevenS1
“[The Department of  Homeland Security] has no easy way to identify those individuals who have overstayed their 
visas.”
     -Ruth Ellen Wasem, Congressional Research Service2
i. intrOduCtiOn
The United States does not have a comprehensive system for tracking aliens’3 departures.  The 
lack of  a comprehensive exit tracking system contrasts with the rigorous, biometric entry inspections 
conducted by U.S. Customs and Border Protection.4  U.S. inspection practices also contrast with 
international norms.  Whereas many other countries inspect departing aliens, few other countries 
1  J.D. Candidate 2013, George Mason University School of  Law; B.A. 2005, University Professors Program at Boston 
University.  Thanks are due to Juan P. Osuna and David L. Neal for helpful discussions during the drafting process and 
to Nathan A. Sales and my father Ashley J. Stevens for review of  the final draft.  The views expressed in this paper do 
not represent the views of  these individuals or of  any organizations with which they are associated.
2  ruth ellen waSem, COng. reS. Serv., Overview Of immigratiOn iSSueS in the 112th COngreSS 3 (Jan. 12, 2012).
3  This paper uses the words “alien” and “noncitizen” interchangeably to refer to people who are neither citizens nor 
nationals of  the United States of  America.  The term “alien” is not intended to be derogative.  Rather, it is a technical 
term used throughout U.S. immigration law.  See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (2006) (defining “alien” and using the term 
repeatedly).
4  u.S. deP’t Of hOmeland SeC., US-VISIT What to Expect When Visiting the United States, http://www.dhs.gov/us-
visit-what-expect (last visited Jan. 5, 2013) (describing biometric entry procedures).
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conduct such a thorough, biometric inspection of  arriving aliens as the U.S.5  Many of  the approxi-
mately 11 million undocumented aliens in the U.S. have remained in the country past their periods 
of  authorized stay.6  However, the U.S.’s failure to track departures means that the U.S. government 
does not know who has overstayed.
This paper will argue that exit tracking would be an important tool for reinforcing the integrity 
of  the immigration system, although implementing it at land borders would be burdensome.  Part II 
of  this paper discusses current and past law and procedure on exit tracking.  Part III discusses the 
purposes of  exit tracking, and argues that immigration enforcement is the primary purpose, national 
security is the secondary purpose, and information and criminal law enforcement are two tertiary 
purposes.  Part IV discusses the four competing interests at stake: immigration enforcement, privacy, 
cost, and freedom of  movement.  Part V discusses the effects of  exit tracking on different popula-
tions and entities.  Part VI discusses implementing exit tracking and focuses on creative proposals to 
alleviate the heavy burdens imposed by exit tracking at land borders.
ii. BaCkgrOund
Current U.S. entry inspection practices are a good starting point for discussion of  exit track-
ing.  When travelers enter the country, they are usually inspected by an officer from U.S. Customs 
and Border Protection (“CBP”).  This normally entails a short conversation and a check of  travel 
documents, and the officer will often check computer databases for negative information about the 
traveler.7  Many travelers are issued an I-94 card to document their entry, and they are supposed to 
turn in this card upon departure.8  Entry inspection is one of  the primary means of  enforcing the 
immigration laws: CBP decides whether travelers may enter and for how long.  Beginning in 2004, 
the U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology program (“US-VISIT”) transformed 
the inspection process.9  US-VISIT added a biometric component to inspection: many travelers 
now have their fingerprints and photograph taken during inspection.10  With US-VISIT, a secondary 
5  Japan and South Korea are among the few countries that do biometric entry inspection.  immigr. Bureau, miniStrY 
Of JuSt., gOv’t Of JaPan, New Entry Procedures Will Start, http://www.immi-moj.go.jp/keiziban/happyou/pdf/
poster-english.pdf; u.S. deP’t Of State, Japan Country Specific Information (last visited Oct. 9, 2012), http://travel.state.
gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/cis/cis_1148.html; u.S. emBaSSY SeOul, New Biometric Procedures for Foreigners Entering the Republic of  
Korea Go Into Effect on January 1, 2012 (last visited Oct. 9, 2012), http://photos.state.gov/libraries/korea/187344/ACS_
Newsletter/Biometric_Procedures_Jan03_2012.pdf; u.S. deP’t Of State, Republic of  Korea Country Specific Information (last 
visited Oct. 9, 2012), http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/cis/cis_1018.html.
6  Alexandra Marks, Should US Track Each Foreigner’s Exit?, ChriStian SCi. mOnitOr (Bos.), Jan. 22, 2007, at 3.
7  StanleY mailman et al., immigratiOn law and PrOCedure § 8.05[2] (2011).
8  u.S. CuStOmS & BOrder PrOteCtiOn, Filling Out Arrival-Departure Record, CBP Form I-94, for Nonimmigrant Visitors 
With A Visa for the U.S. (July 2, 2010), http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/travel/id_visa/i-94_instructions/filling_out_i94.
xml.
9  u.S. deP’t Of hOmeland SeC., US-VISIT What to Expect When Visiting the United States, http://www.dhs.gov/us-
visit-what-expect (last visited Jan. 5, 2013).
10  u.S. deP’t Of hOmeland SeC., US-VISIT (last visited Oct. 9, 2012), http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/usvisit/
US-VISIT_English_Web_Pamphlet.pdf.
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purpose of  inspection is to gather biometric data for interior or general law enforcement purposes.11  
This data allows interior law enforcement agencies to identify aliens accurately.12
While entry inspection is thorough, the Department of  Homeland Security (“DHS”) generally 
does not inspect departing travelers for immigration purposes.13  DHS collects information from 
airlines about passengers departing the country by air.14  However, people departing the country by 
land are not inspected, nor is any information collected about them.15  The lack of  a comprehensive 
exit inspection means that the government does not know when travelers “overstay,” or remain in 
the country past their periods of  authorized stay.  Visa overstays have become a major problem in 
the U.S.  Best estimates put the current population of  undocumented noncitizens at 11.9 million, 
and overstays comprise 31% to 57% of  the undocumented population,16 or 3.6 million to 6.7 mil-
lion.  John Morton of  U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement estimates that about 300,000 
aliens overstay each year.17
Congress has been trying to create an exit tracking system since 1996, and the 9/11 attacks 
created additional pressure to track departures.  The statutes on exit tracking have changed many 
times, and most of  them can be found at 8 U.S.C. § 1365b.18  The Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act of  1996 first required the Attorney General to “develop an automated 
entry and exit control system that will . . . collect a record of  departure for every alien departing the 
United States and match the records of  departure with the record of  the alien’s arrival in the United 
States.”19  After 16 years, this mandate still has not been implemented.  Four years later, Congress 
tried again and passed the Immigration and Naturalization Service Data Management Improvement 
Act of  2000, which also mandated an exit tracking system but filled in some of  the details.20  In 
2001, the USA-PATRIOT Act required the development of  a biometric standard for verifying the 
11  u.S. deP’t Of hOmeland SeC., Office of  US-VISIT (last modified Mar. 1, 2011), http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/
structure/gc_1190896326320.shtm.
12  Id.
13  Alexandra Marks, Should US Track Each Foreigner’s Exit?, ChriStian SCi. mOnitOr (Bos.), Jan. 22, 2007, at 3.
14  u.S. deP’t Of hOmeland SeC., Privacy Impact Assessment for the Advance Passenger Information System APIS (Nov. 18, 
2008), http://foiarr.cbp.gov/streamingWord.asp?i=38.
15  Ctr. fOr immigr. Stud., the POlitiCS and PraCtiCalitieS Of exit COntrOlS: rePOrt frOm a Center fOr 
immigratiOn StudieS SYmPOSium 1, 7 (Aug. 2010), available at http://www.cis.org/articles/2010/exit-panel.pdf.
16  ruth ellen waSem, COng. reS. Serv., nOnimmigrant OverStaYS: Brief SYntheSiS Of the iSSue 2 (Jan. 15, 2010).
17  Visa Overstays: Can They Be Eliminated?: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Homeland Security, 112th Cong. 10 
(2010) (statement of  John T. Morton, Assistant Secretary, U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enforcement).
18  For good summaries of  the different bills regarding exit tracking, see u.S. gOv’t aCCOuntaBilitY OffiCe, uS-
viSit PrOgram faCeS StrategiC, OPeratiOnal, and teChnOlOgiCal ChallengeS at land POrtS Of entrY 10-12 
(Dec. 2006); and riChard f. grimmett, COng. reS. Serv., 9/11 COmmiSSiOn reCOmmendatiOnS: imPlementatiOn StatuS 
34-35 (Dec. 4, 2006).
19  Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of  1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009, div. C, 
§ 110 (2006).
20  Immigration and Naturalization Service Data Management Improvement Act of  2000, Pub. L. No. 106-215, 114 
Stat. 337 (2000).
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identities of  noncitizens applying for visas or for admission.21  The Enhanced Border Security and 
Visa Entry Reform Act of  2002 required commercial air and sea vessels departing the U.S. to submit 
manifests with detailed information on every occupant.22  Finally, in 2004, the Intelligence Reform 
and Terrorism Prevention Act of  2004 required a biometric exit system, using the identity standard 
developed under the USA-PATRIOT Act.23
Currently, DHS does collect information about some departures.  First, DHS issues I-94 cards 
to most nonimmigrants upon arrival, and travelers are supposed to turn them in to transportation 
carriers upon departure.24  However, compliance with this system is so low that the system does not 
yield good enough data for immigration enforcement purposes.  In 2009, 39 million aliens were ad-
mitted on nonimmigrant visas, and about three million of  them never turned in I-94 cards.25  While 
some of  those three million may have overstayed, most of  them likely departed without turning in 
the I-94 card.  With three million annual noncompliances, this system identifies too many overstay 
“false positives” for the system to be useful.26  DHS cannot investigate three million leads.  Second, 
through the Advance Passenger Information System (“APIS”), DHS collects passenger manifests 
from commercial air and sea vessels departing the U.S.27  The transportation company collects 
information from passengers, including information from passports, and transmits the information 
electronically to DHS.28  This system also has gaps.  A dual citizen may enter on one passport and 
depart on another, which would prevent DHS from matching the entry and exit records.  Also, a 
traveler may arrive by air but depart by land, so there would be an entry record but no exit record.29  
An underlying weakness to both the I-94 and manifest systems is that they rely on private transpor-
tation companies to verify travelers’ identities.  The I-94 cards are turned in to transportation com-
panies, 30 so only a company has the opportunity to match the name on an I-94 card to a traveler’s 
21  Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism 
Act of  2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 403(c), 115 Stat. 272 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1379).
22  Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of  2002, Pub. L. No. 107-173, § 402, 116 Stat. 543 (2002).
23  Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of  2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458, § 7208, 118 Stat. 3638 (2004).
24  u.S. CuStOmS & BOrder PrOteCtiOn, Filling Out Arrival-Departure Record, CBP Form I-94, for Nonimmigrant Visitors 
With A Visa for the U.S. (July 2, 2010), http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/travel/id_visa/i-94_instructions/filling_out_i94.
xml.
25  James C. McKinley Jr. & Julia Preston, U.S. Can’t Trace Foreign Visitors on Expired Visas, n.Y. timeS, Oct. 11, 2009, at 
A1.
26  Visa Overstays: Can They Be Eliminated?: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Homeland Security, 112th Cong. 23-
24 (2010) (statement of  Edward Alden, Senior Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations) (describing shortcomings in the 
I-94 system).
27  u.S. deP’t Of hOmeland SeC., Privacy Impact Assessment for the Advance Passenger Information System APIS (Nov. 18, 
2008), http://foiarr.cbp.gov/streamingWord.asp?i=38.
28  Id. at 2.
29  Visa Overstays: Can They Be Eliminated?: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Homeland Security, 112th Cong. 21 
(2010) (statement of  Edward Alden, Senior Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations).
30  u.S. CuStOmS & BOrder PrOteCtiOn, Filling Out Arrival-Departure Record, CBP Form I-94, for Nonimmigrant Visitors 
With A Visa for the U.S. (July 2, 2010), http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/travel/id_visa/i-94_instructions/filling_out_i94.
xml.
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passport.  Similarly, APIS information is collected by transportation companies,31 so only a company 
has a chance to identify the traveler and ensure that DHS receives accurate information.
DHS has successfully used the available data to find overstays still in the U.S. and to deny vi-
sas or reentry to overstays who have left the U.S.  US-VISIT uses complex algorithms and manual 
review to identify overstays using available data.  In 2009, US-VISIT put almost 17,000 names on a 
list of  people who had overstayed and then left the U.S.  This list allowed the Department of  State 
to deny visas to 1,065 people and allowed CBP to deny admission to 1,437 people in one year.32  In 
2009, US-VISIT also identified 16,000 overstays still in the U.S. and forwarded their names to U.S. 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) for investigation.  These leads resulted in 568 ar-
rests in one year.33  This is impressive work, but considering about 300,000 travelers overstay each 
year, these small enforcement numbers represent a drop in the bucket.
Since 2001, DHS has run several projects with exit tracking components.  First, the controversial 
National Security Entry-Exit Registration System (“NSEERS”) required citizens of  certain countries 
to report to Immigration and Naturalization Service or DHS officers upon departure.34  If  an alien 
subject to NSEERS failed to report his or her departure, he or she was presumed inadmissible in the 
future.  DHS terminated this program in 2011 because it had become redundant.35  DHS has also 
run pilot projects testing exit inspection.  It tested a biometric exit tracking program at 14 air- and 
seaports from 2004 to 2007.36  This project tested three setups: self-service kiosks, “mobile devices” 
presumably operated by government personnel, and a combination of  the two.37  This project 
showed that biometric exit tracking is technically feasible at air- and seaports, but passenger compli-
ance was low.38  From 2005 to 2006, DHS also ran a pilot program at five land ports that used radio 
frequency identification technology (“RFID”) to scan travel documents as people drove out of  the 
country.39  The problem with RFID is that it could not physically match travelers to their documents. 
Even if  the system recorded a document as leaving the country, there was no guarantee that the doc-
31  u.S. deP’t Of hOmeland SeC., Privacy Impact Assessment for the Advance Passenger Information System APIS 2 (Nov. 18, 
2008), http://foiarr.cbp.gov/streamingWord.asp?i=38.
32  Visa Overstays: Can They Be Eliminated?: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Homeland Security, 112th Cong. 
4-5 (2010) (statement of  Rand Beers, Under Secretary, National Protection and Programs Directorate, Department of  
Homeland Security).
33  Visa Overstays: Can They Be Eliminated?: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Homeland Security, 112th Cong. 
8 (2010) (statement of  Rand Beers, Under Secretary, National Protection and Programs Directorate, Department of  
Homeland Security).
34  Registration and Monitoring of  Certain Nonimmigrants, 67 Fed. Reg. 52584 (Aug. 12, 2002) (to be codified at 8 
C.F.R. pts. 214 & 264).
35  Removing Designated Countries From the National Security Entry-Exit Registration System (NSEERS), 76 Fed. 
Reg. 23830 (April 28, 2011).
36  u.S. gOv’t aCCOuntaBilitY OffiCe, uS-viSit PilOt evaluatiOnS Offer limited underStanding Of air exit 
OPtiOnS 23 (Aug. 2010).
37  Id.
38  Id.
39  Alexandra Marks, Should US Track Each Foreigner’s Exit?, ChriStian SCi. mOnitOr (Bos.), Jan. 22, 2007, at 3; Rachel 
L. Swarns & Eric Lipton, Administration to Drop Effort to Track if  Visitors Leave, n.Y. timeS, Dec. 14, 2006, at A1.
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ument was being carried by the person to whom it was issued.40  Finally, DHS ran a pilot project in 
2009 testing two different configurations for exit tracking at airports.41  One configuration involved 
CBP officers scanning travelers at the gate, and another configuration involved the Transportation 
Security Administration (“TSA”) scanning travelers at the aviation security checkpoint.
iii. the PurPOSeS Of exit traCking
Exit tracking could serve four possible purposes: immigration enforcement, national security, 
enforcement of  criminal laws, and informational purposes.  It is important to trace how each of  
these policies factors into an exit tracking system because the system will be shaped by the policies 
underlying it.  Immigration enforcement is the primary goal, national security is the secondary goal, 
and criminal law enforcement and information are tertiary goals.
Immigration Enforcement
The primary purpose of  an exit tracking system would be to enforce the immigration laws.42  
Exit tracking would help immigration enforcement in five ways.  First, exit tracking would help the 
government enforce the three and ten year bars to reentry for illegal presence.  The Immigration 
and Nationality Act contains penalties for overstaying visas.  Aliens are inadmissible for three years 
if  they were unlawfully present in the U.S. for 180 days to one year, and they are inadmissible for ten 
years if  they were unlawfully present in the U.S. for one year or longer.43  One common way to ac-
cumulate unlawful presence is to overstay a nonimmigrant visa.  Since there is currently no compre-
hensive exit tracking system, enforcement of  these reentry bars is difficult and haphazard.  With an 
exit tracking system, enforcement of  the reentry bars would be easy.  If  someone overstayed his or 
her visa, left the U.S., and applied for a new visa or for admission, government agencies would have 
reliable information that the person overstayed and could deny the application.
 Second, exit tracking would enable stronger enforcement of  two grounds of  deportability.  
Aliens are deportable if  they are in the U.S. in violation of  law or if  they fail to maintain nonim-
migrant status.44  Overstaying a nonimmigrant visa triggers both these grounds of  deportability, but 
since there is no comprehensive exit tracking system, the government does not have complete infor-
mation on who triggers these grounds of  deportability.  With an exit tracking system, the govern-
ment could discover when someone overstays and could begin removal proceedings.  One commen-
tator has suggested that, if  overstays are targeted for deportation, the government should focus on 
40  u.S. gOv’ aCCOuntaBilitY OffiCe, uS-viSit PrOgram faCeS StrategiC, OPeratiOnal, and teChnOlOgiCal 
ChallengeS at land POrtS Of entrY 46-53 (Dec. 2006).
41  u.S. deP’t Of hOmeland SeC., DHS Begins Test of  Biometric Exit Procedures at Two U.S. Airports (last modified May 
28, 2009), http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/releases/pr_1243605893203.shtm; u.S. gOv’t aCCOuntaBilitY OffiCe, uS-
viSit PilOt evaluatiOnS Offer limited underStanding Of air exit OPtiOnS 25 (Aug. 2010).
42  Nathan A. Sales, Exit Stage Right, nat’l rev. Online (Apr. 24, 2008 4:00 AM) www.nationalreview.com/blogs/
print/224294.
43  8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i) (2006).
44  8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B)-(C) (2006).
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long-term overstays and not prosecute short-term overstays.45  Some short overstays are legitimate: a 
noncitizen may apply for an immigration benefit and then go out of  status temporarily while wait-
ing several months for a decision on the application.46  Disregarding short overstays would protect 
legitimate cases like this.
Third, exit tracking would enable another mode of  immigration enforcement that would be 
cheap and gentle.47  If  ICE knew a noncitizen had overstayed, it could send the alien a letter in-
forming him that his overstay had been noted by the government, and telling him the penalties for 
continuing to remain in the USA illegally.  These letters would remind overstayers of  obligations 
to comply with the law, and they would raise the prospect of  deportation in the overstayers’ minds.  
Many overstayers might depart voluntarily once they knew that the government had noticed their 
overstays.  This mode of  enforcement would be cheap because detention and removal proceedings 
would not be necessary.  It would also be gentle because it would allow the noncitizen to depart on 
his or her own terms.  The downside to this mode of  enforcement is that ICE may be unable to find 
mailing addresses for many overstayers.  This problem could be solved by demanding email address-
es from travelers during the visa application process and sending emails instead.
Fourth, exit tracking would make it easier for ICE to target any alien for deportation.  Currently, 
when ICE targets for deportation someone whom it does not have in custody, it must first investi-
gate whether that person is still in the country.48  With exit tracking, ICE would not have to investi-
gate whether a noncitizen is still in the United States.  This would free up resources and enable ICE 
to focus on other aspects of  immigration enforcement.
Fifth, exit tracking would help clear the backlog of  outstanding final orders of  removal.  There 
are about 400,000 outstanding final orders of  removal in the United States.49  An outstanding final 
order of  removal means that the government has ordered a person removed from the country, but 
DHS has not yet enforced that order.  Many of  these people may have departed from the United 
States voluntarily, but without exit tracking the government has no way of  knowing who has left.  
Canada has a similar number of  outstanding final orders of  removal relative to its population, and its 
main interest in exit tracking is clearing the backlog.50  If  someone with a final order of  removal has 
already left, instituting exit tracking after his or her departure would not clear the order of  removal 
because it would be too late to record the departure.  However, exit tracking would reduce part of  
the backlog and prevent new cases from accumulating.
Enumerating the ways in which exit tracking aids immigration enforcement naturally leads to a 
comparison between deportation and denying admission.  Denying visas or admission to all over-
stayers would be cheap and easy with an exit tracking system, but deporting all overstayers would be 
expensive, time-consuming, and difficult even with exit tracking.  Deportation or removal can be a 
45  Ctr. fOr immigr. Stud., the POlitiCS and PraCtiCalitieS Of exit COntrOlS: rePOrt frOm a Center fOr 
immigratiOn StudieS SYmPOSium 2 (Aug. 2010), available at http://www.cis.org/articles/2010/exit-panel.pdf.
46  Id. at 2-3.
47  Id. at 11.
48  Id.
49  Id. at 9.
50  Id.
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lengthy, expensive, messy process, sometimes taking several years51 and costing on average $12,500 
per person.52  It hinges on the resource availability of  ICE, administrative adjudicators in the Execu-
tive Office for Immigration Review (“EOIR”), and the federal judicial courts.  ICE currently faces 
more immigration violations than it can process.53  EOIR is also underfunded,54 and in 2009 it com-
pleted 290,233 immigration proceedings55 with only 232 immigration judges56 and 62 law clerks.57  
The lack of  resources for immigration enforcement means that exit tracking probably would not 
lead to an immediate, precipitous increase in the number of  deportations.  However, ifmore resourc-
es become available in the future, exit tracking would give ICE the information it needs to remove 
more overstayers.
National Security
A secondary purpose of  exit tracking is national security.  National security also underlies many 
of  the immigration laws, so it is difficult to analyze national security separately from immigration 
enforcement.  However, much of  the recent discussion of  exit tracking has viewed the issue exclu-
sively through a national security or counterterrorism lens.  This is a mistake.  Hundreds of  millions 
of  people travel into and out of  the country every year,58 and exit tracking has the potential to dis-
rupt the travel of  everybody.  The government should only subject millions of  people to increased 
administrative burdens if  there is a clear reason to do so. If  a policy has high costs, the government 
should only implement it if  the need for that policy is also great.  The link between exit tracking and 
terrorism is tenuous, and exit tracking cannot be justified solely on counterterrorism grounds.
There is significant prima facie evidence that exit tracking is a counterterrorism issue.  First, four 
51  BOgle & Chang, llC, Deportation and Removal (2010), http://www.immigrationlegalteam.com/Deportation_
Defense.html (“The length of  the deportation proceedings can last from several months if  the immigrant is in custody, 
to several years if  the immigrant is out of  custody.”).
52  aSSOCiated PreSS, Feds Estimate Deportation Costs $12,500 Per Person, CnSnewS.COm (Jan. 27, 2011), http://cnsnews.
com/news/article/feds-estimate-deportation-costs-12500-person.
53  ICE recently announced, “[T]he agency is confronted with more administrative violations than its resources can 
address . . . .”  John Morton, Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion Consistent with the Civil Immigration Enforcement Priorities of  
the Agency for the Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of  Aliens, u.S. immigr. & CuStOmS enfOrCement 2 (June 17, 2011), 
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/prosecutorial-discretion-memo.pdf.
54  arnOld & POrter llP, Reforming the Immigration System: Proposals to Promote Independence, Fairness, Efficiency, and 
Professionalism in the Adjudication of  Removal Cases, 2010 a.B.a. COmm’n On immigr. 2-16.
55  OffiCe Of Planning, analYSiS, & teCh., FY 2009 Statistical Year Book, exeCutive OffiCe fOr immigr. review B6 
(Mar. 2010), http://www.justice.gov/eoir/statspub/fy09syb.pdf.
56  OffiCe Of legiS. & PuBliC affairS, Fact Sheet: Executive Office for Immigration Review Immigration Judge Hiring Initiative, 
exeCutive OffiCe fOr immigr. review 3 (Mar. 11, 2010), http://www.justice.gov/eoir/press/2010/EOIR_IJHiring_
FactSheet.pdf.
57  arnOld & POrter llP, Reforming the Immigration System: Proposals to Promote Independence, Fairness, Efficiency, and 
Professionalism in the Adjudication of  Removal Cases, 2010 a.B.a. COmm’n On immigr. 2-17.
58  u.S. gOv’t aCCOuntaBilitY OffiCe, uS-viSit PrOgram faCeS StrategiC, OPeratiOnal, and teChnOlOgiCal 
ChallengeS at land POrtS Of entrY 16 (deC. 2006).
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of  the nineteen 9/11 hijackers overstayed their visas.59  Second, Amine El Khalifi, who was ar-
rested for attempting to attack the U.S. Capitol, overstayed his visa for years.60  Third, Hosam Maher 
Husein Smadi, who was arrested for attempting to bomb a Dallas skyscraper, had also overstayed.61  
Fourth, from September 11, 2001 to 2012, more than 36 overstayers were convicted of  “terrorism-
related charges.”62  This evidence initially creates an impression that overstays and exit tracking are 
national security issues.
Evidence abounds that policymakers have bought into this narrative.  First, Congress has em-
bodied this view in statute, “[C]ompleting a biometric entry and exit data system as expeditiously 
as possible is an essential investment in efforts to protect the United States by preventing the entry 
of  terrorists.”63  Second, Candice Miller, Chairman of  the House of  Representatives Subcommittee 
on Border and Maritime Security, used the Amine El Khalifi case to push for exit tracking.64  Third, 
DHS recently announced that plans for exit tracking are forthcoming, and the announcement was 
made by John Cohen, DHS’s Deputy Counterterrorism Coordinator.65  This suggests that counter-
terrorism policies are the animating spirit of  recent government activity on exit tracking.  However, 
the empirical and logical link between overstaying and terrorism is weak.
Four of  the 9/11 hijackers overstayed, but the whole overstay population was several million.  
Four out of  several million is not statistically significant.  To justify targeting the entire overstay pop-
ulation of  several million people, there must be statistically significant evidence that overstayers are 
more likely to commit acts of  terrorism.  It is true that many terrorists who would like to attack the 
U.S. are noncitizens, and that it is sometimes possible for a noncitizen to get a visa, overstay it, and 
commit terrorist attacks.  However, it is possible for any type of  person to commit terrorist attacks.
There are only two links between overstaying and terrorism, and neither is particularly strong.  
First, overstaying allows noncitizens to remain in the U.S. for longer, and they may use their time 
59  nat’l COmm’n On terrOriSt attaCkS uPOn the united StateS, the 9/11 COmmiSSiOn rePOrt: final rePOrt 
Of the natiOnal COmmiSSiOn On terrOriSt attaCkS uPOn the united StateS (2004).  The overstayers were Zacarias 
Moussaoui (p 273), Satam al Suqami (p 527), Mohamed Atta (p 564), and Nawaf  al Hazmi (p 564).
60  Sari Horowitz et al., Federal Agents Arrest Amine El Khalifi; He Allegedly Planned to Bomb Capitol, waSh. POSt (Feb. 17, 
2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/federal-agents-arrest-man-who-allegedly-planned-
suicide-bombing-on-us-capitol/2012/02/17/gIQAtYZ7JR_story.html.
61  James C. McKinley Jr. & Julia Preston, U.S. Can’t Trace Foreign Visitors on Expired Visas, n.Y. timeS, Oct. 11, 2009, at 
A1.
62  Rep. Candice S. Miller, Further Securing Our Homeland Against Our Terrorist Enemies (Mar. 26, 2012), http://
candicemiller.house.gov/press-release/rep-miller-further-securing-our-homeland-against-our-terrorist-enemies.
63  8 U.S.C. § 1365b(a) (2006), enacted by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of  2004, Pub. L. No. 
108-458, § 7208, 118 Stat. 3638 (2004).
64  From the 9/11 Hijackers to Amine el-Khalifi: Terrorists and the Visa Overstay Problem: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Border 
& Mar. Sec. of  the H. Comm. on Homeland Sec., 112th Cong. (2012) (statement of  Rep. Candice S. Miller, Chairman, H. 
Subcomm. on Border & Mar. Sec. of  the H. Comm. on Homeland Sec.), available at http://homeland.house.gov/
hearing/subcommittee-hearing-911-hijackers-amine-el-khalifi-terrorists-and-visa-overstay-problem.
65  From the 9/11 Hijackers to Amine el-Khalifi: Terrorists and the Visa Overstay Problem: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Border 
& Mar. Sec. of  the H. Comm. on Homeland Sec., 112th Cong. (2012) (statement of  John Cohen, Deputy Counterterrorism 
Coordinator, Dep’t of  Homeland Sec.), available at  http://www.dhs.gov/news/2012/03/07/written-testimony-deputy-
counterterrorism-coordinator-and-ice-homeland-security.
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in the U.S. to plan attacks.  However, this proposition does not go very far.  Many noncitizens are 
admitted on tourist visas, as were at least 13 of  the 9/11 hijackers.66  Tourists are often authorized to 
stay for six months, and this is plenty of  time for a committed terrorist to carry out an attack.  The 
second link between overstaying and terrorism is more significant: overstayers are deportable, so if  
there is any suspicion at all that an overstayer is planning an attack, the government can deport the 
person.  It is much easier to deport someone than it is to criminally prosecute him or her for ter-
rorism.67  There are only two links between overstaying and terrorism; one is weak and the other is 
significant but not significant enough to justify the costs of  exit tracking.
Although the attacks of  9/11 stimulated interest in exit tracking, exit tracking would not have 
hindered the attacks.  The 9/11 Commission Report only specifies the length of  overstay for two 
of  the four hijacker overstayers.  Satam al Suqami overstayed for four months and Nawaf  al Hazmi 
overstayed for eight months.68  Even if  ICE were given the many billions of  dollars it would need 
to go after all overstays, it still would not have prevented these two men from participating in the at-
tacks.  Four months is arguably within the ambit of  potentially legitimate overstays that the govern-
ment should not prosecute, as discussed above.  Regarding Hazmi, eight months is often not long 
enough to complete removal proceedings, which can take years.69  Even if  Hazmi had been arrested 
the same day he overstayed, he probably would have posted bond and would have been free to 
commit the attacks, unless there were credible information that he was a national security threat.  If  
such information did exist, it would likely be strong enough to detain him without bond on criminal 
charges.  Exit tracking would not have given the U.S. any protection from Hazmi that the criminal 
justice system did not already provide.
Since 2001, no overstayer has successfully committed a terrorist attack on the U.S.  Even if  over-
staying were a national security threat in 2001, counterterrorism resources have increased so dramati-
cally since then that overstaying is no longer a terrorist threat.  Policymakers thought NSEERS was 
necessary after 9/11, but by 2011 the program was redundant due to improved intelligence sharing 
and DHS terminated it.70  Policymakers should not fall into the trap of  designing policies based 
solely on the failures of  the past, and examinations of  past failures should be tempered by reason.  
Amine El Khalifi and Hosam Maher Husein Smadi represent law enforcement successes, not visa 
66  nat’l COmm’n On terrOriSt attaCkS uPOn the united StateS, the 9/11 COmmiSSiOn rePOrt: final rePOrt Of 
the natiOnal COmmiSSiOn On terrOriSt attaCkS uPOn the united StateS 527 n.114 (2004).
67  Mary Beth Sheridan, Immigration Law as Anti-Terrorism Tool, waSh. POSt, June 13, 2005, at A1 (“Whereas terrorism 
charges can be difficult to prosecute, Homeland Security officials say immigration laws can provide a quick, easy way to 
detain people who could be planning attacks.  Authorities have also used routine charges such as overstaying a visa to 
deport suspected supporters of  terrorist groups.”).
68  nat’l COmm’n On terrOriSt attaCkS uPOn the united StateS, the 9/11 COmmiSSiOn rePOrt: final rePOrt Of 
the natiOnal COmmiSSiOn On terrOriSt attaCkS uPOn the united StateS 564 (2004) (“[T]wo hijackers overstayed 
their terms of  admission by four and eight months respectively (Satam al Suqami and Nawaf  al Hazmi).”).
69  BOgle & Chang, llC, Deportation and Removal (2010), http://www.immigrationlegalteam.com/Deportation_
Defense.html.
70  Muzaffar Chishti & Claire Bergeron, migratiOn infOrmatiOn SOurCe, DHS Announces End to Controversial Post-
9/11 Immigrant Registration and Tracking Program 3 (May 17, 2011), http://www.migrationinformation.org/usfocus/display.
cfm?ID=840.
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tracking failures.71  Both culprits were under investigation by the Federal Bureau of  Investigation 
(“FBI”), and were never close to successfully carrying out attacks.72  Similarly, the 36 convictions 
for “terrorism related” charges may represent law enforcement successes rather than visa tracking 
failures.
The goal of  our counterterrorism machinery is to prevent actual terrorist attacks, not to pre-
vent any possible or conceivable attack, and our current systems accomplish this even without exit 
tracking.  The Khalifi and Smadi attempted attacks were orchestrated by the FBI for the purposes 
of  convicting the suspects, and they never actually endangered the public.  It is understandable that 
a cautious lawmaker might ask, “But what if  they actually had been in contact with Al Qaeda, rather 
than with the FBI?”  In that case, their communications would likely have been picked up by the 
National Security Agency and forwarded to the FBI for investigation.  One of  the FBI’s main roles 
is to protect Americans from terrorism, and obviously the U.S. would face greater danger if  the FBI 
did not exist.  Engaging in counterfactual, “What if…?” thinking produces misguided policies that 
misallocate resources.
Exit tracking will cost billions of  dollars, removing all overstayers will cost many billions more, 
and trying to stop potential terrorists at the border is like looking for a “needle in a haystack.”73  If  
counterterrorism is the only goal, those billions of  dollars would be better spent on intelligence.74  
The immigration system can and should be an important weapon in the fight against terrorism, but 
it cannot do all the work.  Law enforcement and intelligence agents also have a critical role to play, 
and terrorism-related arrests of  overstayers do not represent failures.  Exit tracking can and should 
serve national security purposes, but this should not be the only goal.
Immigration enforcement should be the primary goal of  exit tracking and national security a 
secondary goal.75
Enforcement of  Criminal Laws
Exit tracking can support enforcement of  criminal laws, especially laws against smuggling.  If  
a traveler has a history of  smuggling or there is other intelligence that the person may be a smug-
71  Visa Overstays: Can They Be Eliminated?: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Homeland Sec., 112th Cong. 46 
(2010) (statement of  Edward Alden, the Bernard L. Schwartz Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations).
72  Regarding Khalifi, see Sari Horowitz et al., Federal Agents Arrest Amine El Khalifi; He Allegedly Planned to Bomb Capitol, 
waSh. POSt (Feb. 17, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/federal-agents-arrest-man-who-
allegedly-planned-suicide-bombing-on-us-capitol/2012/02/17/gIQAtYZ7JR_story.html (“[Authorities] said Khalifi 
had been the subject of  a lengthy investigation and never posed a threat to the public.”).  Regarding Smadi, see James C. 
McKinley Jr. & Julia Preston, U.S. Can’t Trace Foreign Visitors on Expired Visas, n.Y. timeS, Oct. 11, 2009, at A1 (“[Smadi] 
met with agents posing as members of  Al Qaeda . . . .  His arrest on terrorism charges came after he parked a truck that 
he had been told was carrying explosives in the building’s underground garage . . . .”).
73  Alexandra Marks, A Harder Look at Visa Overstayers, ChriStian SCi. mOnitOr (Bos.), Feb. 5, 2002, at 2.
74  Alexandra Marks, Should US Track Each Foreigner’s Exit?, ChriStian SCi. mOnitOr (Bos.), Jan. 22, 2007, at 3 (quoting 
Allan Wernick, chairman of  the Citizenship and Immigration Project at the City University of  New York).
75  Accord Nathan A. Sales, Exit Stage Right, nat’l rev. Online (Apr. 24, 2008 4:00 AM) www.nationalreview.com/
blogs/print/224294 (“The main value of  exit is related to immigration — the ability to verify that guests don’t overstay 
their welcome . . . .  While exit is largely about immigration, it also has national security-advantages.”)
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gler, the traveler could be subjected to increased security screening while exiting the country.  Also, 
people with outstanding arrest warrants for any type of  crime, from murder to reckless driving, 
could be arrested as they exit the country.  As a person is processed for exit inspection, DHS could 
query a national database of  arrest warrants, such as the National Crime Information Center.76  If  
the query finds an outstanding warrant, the person could be detained for further investigation.  Out-
standing arrest warrants are the most common reason for stopping people during exit inspection in 
Australia.77
Informational Purposes
The final purpose of  exit tracking is to produce information that could be used in various situa-
tions.  Exit tracking would give the government reliable information on who is in the country.  This 
information could be used many ways, four examples of  which are most evident.  First, it would 
help the government craft immigration policy.  If  the government knows that people from a certain 
country or people in a certain visa category are overstaying at a higher than normal rate, it can adjust 
immigration policy accordingly.  Second, the information could serve diplomatic purposes.  If  there 
is ever a disaster in the U.S., other countries might appreciate knowing how many of  their citizens 
are in the U.S.  Third, the information could serve national security.  If  the U.S. ever declares war on 
a foreign state and wants to investigate noncitizens from that state, knowing how many of  them are 
in the country would provide a starting point.  Fourth, if  the government ever wants to provide ser-
vices to noncitizens, knowing how many of  them are in the country would be helpful.  For example, 
if  nationals from a certain country are found to carry a contagious disease, knowing how many of  
them are in the U.S. would allow the government to deploy adequate resources to treat them.
Immigration enforcement is the primary goal of  exit tracking, national security is a secondary 
goal, and criminal law enforcement and information are tertiary goals.  Since implementation differs 
depending on the objectives,78 this leads to one important principle for an exit tracking system.  The 
main goal of  exit tracking is to reduce the number of  noncitizens present in the U.S. illegally, so it 
does not necessarily need to track every single departure of  a noncitizen.  The goal is to slowly but 
surely chip away at the number of  undocumented aliens, not to apprehend all of  them immediately.  
However, if  counterterrorism were the only goal, the system would have to track every single depar-
ture, because even a single terrorist can cause havoc.79
76  This FBI database contains information about “wanted persons” with outstanding warrants, among other things.  
fed. Bureau Of inveStigatiOn, National Crime Information Center, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ncic (last visited Jan. 
5, 2013).
77  Ctr. fOr immigr. Stud., the POlitiCS and PraCtiCalitieS Of exit COntrOlS: rePOrt frOm a Center fOr 
immigratiOn StudieS SYmPOSium 8 (Aug. 2010), available at http://www.cis.org/articles/2010/exit-panel.pdf.
78  Id. at 5.
79  Edward Alden, Immigration and Border Control, 32 CatO J. 107, 114 (2012).
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iv. the COmPeting intereStS at Stake
Exit tracking affects many different areas of  public interest, and any successful implementation 
of  exit tracking must balance them.  Four interests are most prominent: immigration enforcement, 
privacy, cost, and freedom of  movement.
First, immigration enforcement is the main purpose of  exit tracking.80  Exit tracking will give law 
enforcement agencies more information they can use (or abuse) in the course of  doing their job.  It 
will also subject immigrants to the possibility of  tighter enforcement of  the laws against overstaying.  
On the other hand, if  the government can reduce the number of  overstayers, it may actually be able 
to admit more noncitizens because the immigration system would not be as heavily burdened.
Second, exit tracking affects privacy rights.81  There are various ways of  implementing exit track-
ing, from an automated biometric system to an interview, and they all involve government intrud-
ing into people’s lives to acquire more information about them.  Biometric exit tracking systems are 
particularly problematic because they take information directly from people’s bodies, and therefore 
represent an intrusion of  the government into the most private sphere of  personal life.  Many peo-
ple will face the hassle of  an additional procedure before leaving the country, and most people will 
not enjoy having to give fingerprints.  However, the arguments against biometric data collection are 
not strong.  First, biometric data collection must be compared to the alternatives.  If  there must be 
some sort of  exit inspection, and the only two options are an automated biometric system or waiting 
in a long line for an interview with an officer, some people may find the automated biometric system 
less intrusive.  Second, biometric exit tracking would not give the government access to new types 
of  data.  The government already has access to much biometric information about aliens through 
US-VISIT, and it already has access to departure information on aliens departing by air and sea from 
passenger manifests.82  Biometric exit tracking only involves a linking of  the two types of  data, such 
as linking a fingerprint to a specific departure.  Comprehensive exit tracking will merely produce 
information about more departures, and the government is entitled to know when noncitizens cross 
U.S. borders.
The third interest at stake is cost.  A comprehensive exit tracking system will cost billions of  
dollars.  The entry portion of  US-VISIT was relatively cheap to deploy because it piggybacked on 
the pre-existing infrastructure for entry inspection.83  However, DHS currently does not inspect 
departing travelers, so exit tracking would require large upfront expenditures for new infrastructure 
80  Supra Part III.
81  For discussion of  the privacy issues involved in exit tracking, see u.S. deP’t Of hOmeland SeC., Privacy Impact 
Assessment for the United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) Program Comprehensive Exit Program: 
Air Exit Pilot (May. 20, 2008), http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_pia_usvisit_air_exit.pdf.
82  Supra Part II.
83  As of  2010, DHS had spent $1.3 billion on the entry portion of  US-VISIT.  diem nguYen & Jena Baker 
mCneill, BiOmetriC exit PrOgramS ShOw need fOr new StrategY tO reduCe viSa OverStaYS 4 (Heritage Found., 
2010), available at http://s3.amazonaws.com/thf_media/2010/pdf/bg_2358.pdf.
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at all land and sea ports of  entry.84  At airports, exit tracking could piggyback on the pre-existing 
TSA infrastructure for security screening.  Since DHS would need new personnel to run the pro-
gram, there would also be ongoing expenditures.  There are many different estimates of  how much 
exit tracking would actually cost: $1.3 billion to $2.8 billion,85 $3.1 to $6.4 billion over ten years,86 ten 
billion dollars,87 and tens of  billions of  dollars.88  Some have rightly questioned whether exit tracking 
is worth it.89  Currently, exit tracking is an unfunded mandate.90  One may interpret this as reflecting 
conflicting views within Congress on the value of  exit tracking.  For there to be any hope of  imple-
menting exit tracking, an economic study of  the costs involved must be commissioned.  Currently, 
all that one can say is that it would cost billions of  dollars.
Fourth, exit tracking could hinder freedom of  movement, which includes movement of  both 
people and goods.91  There is a strong public interest in allowing the legitimate passage of  people 
and goods.  International trade and travel are essential for the U.S.’s economic and technological 
prowess, and an enlightened government should aim to allow people as much freedom of  move-
ment as possible.  Welcoming noncitizens strengthens our diplomatic relationships and builds the 
“soft power” of  the United States; it strengthens our leadership of  the international community.  
Exit tracking imposes an additional procedure or obstacle that travelers must overcome to leave the 
country.  Many travelers may find their departures delayed while they wait to be processed.  These 
delays may affect U.S. citizens and noncitizens, depending on the context and the system’s design.  
In the case of  airports, even domestic travelers may face delays if  the system is underresourced or 
designed poorly.  Airline passengers are accustomed to extensive security screening before flights, 
so adding one more procedure may not impact air travelers very much.  However, at land borders, 
84  For discussion of  the need for new infrastructure, see u.S. gOv’t aCCOuntaBilitY OffiCe, uS-viSit PrOgram 
faCeS StrategiC, OPeratiOnal, and teChnOlOgiCal ChallengeS at land POrtS Of entrY 40-41 (Dec. 2006).
85  Ctr. fOr immigr. Stud., the POlitiCS and PraCtiCalitieS Of exit COntrOlS: rePOrt frOm a Center fOr 
immigratiOn StudieS SYmPOSium 1 (Aug. 2010), available at http://www.cis.org/articles/2010/exit-panel.pdf.
86  diem nguYen & Jena Baker mCneill, BiOmetriC exit PrOgramS ShOw need fOr new StrategY tO reduCe 
viSa OverStaYS 4 (Heritage Found., 2010), available at http://s3.amazonaws.com/thf_media/2010/pdf/bg_2358.pdf.
87  Ctr. fOr immigr. Stud., the POlitiCS and PraCtiCalitieS Of exit COntrOlS: rePOrt frOm a Center fOr 
immigratiOn StudieS SYmPOSium 3 (Aug. 2010), available at http://www.cis.org/articles/2010/exit-panel.pdf.
88  Alexandra Marks, A Harder Look at Visa Overstayers, ChriStian SCi. mOnitOr (Bos.), Feb. 5, 2002, at 2.
89  “Comparing the risks, costs, and benefits of  a biometric exit system demonstrates that while there is some benefit 
gained from tracking this data, the costs and manpower associated with such a system simply outweigh the benefits.”  
diem nguYen & Jena Baker mCneill, BiOmetriC exit PrOgramS ShOw need fOr new StrategY tO reduCe viSa 
OverStaYS 5 (Heritage Found., 2010), available at http://s3.amazonaws.com/thf_media/2010/pdf/bg_2358.pdf.
90  The DHS budget for fiscal year 2013 includes only one substantive reference to exit tracking, and seems to 
describe efforts to enhance existing systems rather than deploy new programs.  u.S. deP’t Of hOmeland SeC., fY 
2013 Budget in Brief 7 (2012), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/mgmt/dhs-budget-in-brief-fy2013.pdf 
(“DHS has initiated implementation of  an enhanced biographic exit program, which will
better aggregate the information within existing data systems, enhance review of  potential overstays, increase automated 
matching, incorporate biometric elements, and provide the foundation for a future biometric exit solution.”).
91  riChard m. Stana, u.S. gOv’ aCCOuntaBilitY OffiCe, US-VISIT Program Faces Strategic, Operational, and Technological 
Challenges at Land Ports of  Entry 15 (testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology, and Homeland 
Security, Jan. 31, 2007), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07378t.pdf.
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departing travelers currently face no departure procedures at all, and exit tracking will require mil-
lions of  travelers to stop for processing instead of  proceeding freely to Canada or Mexico.  This is 
the strongest objection to exit tracking, and the most likely stumbling block.92  This paper explores 
some creative solutions to this problem below.  Exit tracking should not overly obstruct freedom of  
movement.
The four competing interests at stake in exit tracking are immigration enforcement, privacy, cost, 
and freedom of  movement.  How these policies play out depends on how the system is designed 
and what type of  port is being used.  A few examples of  how these policies interact will be helpful 
in designing an exit tracking system.  First, if  exit tracking is merely biographic instead of  biometric, 
privacy would be served but immigration enforcement would suffer because of  reduced confidence 
that travelers are who they say they are.  Second, if  exit tracking uses poor infrastructure, the system 
may be cheap but it would likely produce poor data for immigration enforcement or impose needless 
delays on travelers.  Third, if  screening queues get backed up at an airport, DHS may decide to clear 
the queue by foregoing exit tracking for a brief  period, which would aid freedom of  movement but 
hinder immigration enforcement.  Finally, in considering a choice between an automated biometric 
system and a biographic system that requires an interview, the biometric system may infringe privacy 
but enable people and goods to pass more quickly.
v. the effeCt Of exit traCking On different POPulatiOnS
Exit tracking will have different effects on different groups of  people.  There are six discern-
ible groups who will be affected differently by exit tracking: U.S. citizens, legal noncitizen travelers, 
overstayers, noncitizens who entered without inspection, passenger transportation companies, and 
freight shipping companies.
U.S. citizens would likely face some inconvenience even though the system is not intended to 
track their departures.  Departing U.S. citizens would have to prove that they are U.S. citizens in 
order to forego exit tracking, which would mean requiring them to produce documents.  However, 
every U.S. citizen leaving the country should already be carrying documents proving citizenship, 
because they need these documents to return to the U.S.93  Therefore, although U.S. citizens would 
likely have to show proof  of  citizenship to forego exit tracking, this would not require them to carry 
any additional documents but merely to produce those documents one more time.  This procedure 
may cause short delays even for U.S. citizens.
Legal noncitizen travelers would similarly face some delay and inconvenience by having to sub-
mit to exit tracking.  Whether the procedure entails giving biometrics, having an interview, or merely 
swiping a passport in a machine, it will be a minor annoyance for millions of  noncitizens departing 
the country.  If  the system is biometric, it will intrude on their privacy by forcing them to submit 
parts of  their body to data capture.
Exit tracking may have undesirable consequences on the behavior of  overstayers: it may discour-
92  Id.
93  u.S. deP’t Of hOmeland SeC., Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative (last visited April 28, 2012), http://www.dhs.gov/
files/programs/gc_1200693579776.shtm.
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age them from leaving the U.S.  This is simple economics.  Exit tracking can impose a high cost for 
illegal presence in the U.S., and some overstayers may rationally try to avoid this penalty.  Overstayers 
may choose not to depart rather than to depart and be barred from reentering.  Although exit track-
ing is intended to reduce the number of  overstayers, it may actually discourage some overstayers 
from leaving because they would face the added penalty of  being unable to return.  Overstayers 
would not have an incentive to dodge exit tracking by sneaking out illegally, because if  an overstayer 
snuck out illegally and then tried to reenter, a CBP officer may notice that their previous departure 
was not logged.  Exit tracking may encourage some overstayers to remain in the U.S. for longer.
Exit tracking would also change the behavior of  noncitizens who entered without inspection 
(“EWIs”).  Under the current system, EWIs can freely depart the U.S. by land without worrying 
excessively that the U.S. government will log their departure or note their illegal presence in the U.S.  
With exit tracking, EWIs would potentially be punished for trying to depart through an authorized 
port of  entry.  Therefore, some EWIs may either simply stay in the U.S. or they may try to sneak out 
illegally.  This may create a new stream of  illegal travel.  Whereas most illegal border crossings are 
committed while entering the U.S., illegal departures might become a new problem for CBP.  Exit 
tracking may encourage some EWIs to remain in the U.S. longer, and may encourage some to sneak 
out of  the U.S. illegally.
Exit tracking may also affect companies.  International airlines, bus services, and train services 
may face complaints from travelers about travel delays.  Also, it would be tragic if  an airline had to 
delay the departure of  an entire aircraft full of  people because a small number of  passengers were 
delayed by exit inspection.  Exit tracking could also change the number of  passengers.  If  delays 
caused by exit tracking are severe, some passengers at the margins may choose not to travel at all.  
Also, if  exit tracking causes delays of  differing severity at air, sea, and land ports of  entry, travelers 
who have a choice between modes of  transportation may adjust their travel accordingly.  For ex-
ample, a traveler from San Antonio, Texas to Monterrey, Mexico may have a choice between flying 
and driving.  If  he faces long delays at the land border caused by exit tracking, he may choose to fly 
instead.  The possibility of  travel delays means that exit tracking may affect the business of  transpor-
tation companies.  This underscores the importance of  making exit processing quick.
Exit tracking may also impact international freight shippers.  If  their employees have to submit 
to an additional procedure before exiting the U.S., vessels may be delayed.  However, this is not as 
big a concern for freight shippers as it is for consumer transportation companies because freight 
vessels carry far fewer people.
vi. imPlementatiOn
Guiding Principles
Exit tracking will be difficult to implement.  A few principles will guide implementation.  First, 
policymakers should aim to work within the current system as much as possible and only make 
reasonable changes that are necessary to accomplish the goals of  exit tracking.  Machiavelli said,       
“[T]here is nothing more difficult to take in hand, more perilous to conduct, or more uncertain in its 
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success, than to take the lead in the introduction of  a new order of  things . . . .”94  An exit tracking 
system should avoid disrupting the status quo except when absolutely necessary.  This will minimize 
cost and opposition to policy changes.
Second, when changes are necessary, they will inconvenience different sectors of  society to vary-
ing degrees, and policymakers must have a clear understanding of  how those burdens should be dis-
tributed.  First and foremost, exit tracking should aim to avoid inconveniencing travelers.  Hundreds 
of  millions of  people cross U.S. borders annually.95  If  exit tracking delays each traveler even for 30 
seconds, and 425 million people depart the U.S. annually,96 it will add up to 3.5 million man hours 
lost per year.  An exit tracking system should differentiate among the different types of  travelers.  
An exit system should take particular care to avoid inconveniencing U.S. citizens and anyone else not 
subject to exit tracking, since there is no compelling reason to collect information about such travel-
ers.  After considering individual travelers, the next most important stakeholders whose interests 
should be considered are transportation companies.  They are much less numerous than individual 
travelers, and, as professionals conducting business in an area of  national importance, a large part 
of  their job is complying with government regulations.  However, exit tracking should mainly be 
conducted by the government.  Airlines refused to participate in the 2009 pilot programs,97 and an 
exit tracking program is unlikely to succeed if  unwilling transportation companies are forced to bear 
the burden of  operating it.  There is an emerging consensus that exit tracking, like entry inspection, 
is primarily a government function.98  Finally, the third most important stakeholders whose inter-
ests should be considered are government agencies like CBP and TSA.  It is their primary function 
to operate government programs for the benefit of  the public, so lawmakers should not be overly 
concerned about changing agency operations.  Indeed, agencies benefit from having more programs, 
because additional programs require bigger budgets and more personnel.  However, for exit tracking 
to succeed, lawmakers must know what they can realistically expect agencies to accomplish with the 
available resources.
Biometric Versus Biographic
One of  the most important decisions about exit tracking is whether it should be biometric or 
biographic.  Biometric systems involve taking information directly from travelers’ bodies, such as 
fingerprints, photographs, and iris scans.  Biographic systems involve collecting information about 
travelers, such as name, date of  birth, nationality, passport number, visa number, and class of  ad-
94  niCOlO maChiavelli, the PrinCe ch. 6 (W. K. Marriott, trans., 2006).  E-book available at http://www.gutenberg.
org/files/1232/1232-h/1232-h.htm.
95  In 2004, there were over 425 million entries, and, it is safe to presume, a similar number of  departures.  u.S. gOv’t 
aCCOuntaBilitY OffiCe, uS-viSit PrOgram faCeS StrategiC, OPeratiOnal, and teChnOlOgiCal ChallengeS at land 
POrtS Of entrY 16 (Dec. 2006).
96  Id.
97  u.S. gOv’t aCCOuntaBilitY OffiCe, uS-viSit PilOt evaluatiOnS Offer limited underStanding Of air exit 
OPtiOnS 29 (Aug. 2010).
98  Ctr. fOr immigr. Stud., the POlitiCS and PraCtiCalitieS Of exit COntrOlS: rePOrt frOm a Center fOr 
immigratiOn StudieS SYmPOSium 1 (Aug. 2010), available at http://www.cis.org/articles/2010/exit-panel.pdf.
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mission.  Debating whether a system should be biometric or biographic is moot to a certain extent, 
because Congress has already mandated a biometric system,99 and there is strong, bipartisan support 
for this.100  However, the biometric mandate has not yet been implemented, Congress has not yet 
provided adequate resources for it, and some people disagree on whether the program should be 
biometric.101
The most obvious advantage of  biometric systems is that they make identity fraud almost im-
possible.102  Travelers can deceive biographic systems by presenting photo-switched or fraudulent 
documents, but travelers cannot change their fingerprints.  A bigger advantage to biometrics is that 
they can be automated, which makes inspection cheaper and faster.  For example, the Global Entry 
program allows certain travelers entering the U.S. to forgo personal interviews with CBP officers and 
instead submit their fingerprints to machines.103  The limitations of  biographic systems become ap-
parent when one considers a congressional requirement for exit tracking.  Congress has required any 
exit tracking system to verify travelers’ identities, meaning it must match the travel document to the 
traveler.104  Considering this reasonable mandate, the only choice for a biographic system is for an 
officer to interview the traveler and verify the identity manually.  As many people have experienced 
while waiting for entry inspection, interviews can create long travel delays.  Also, for interviews to 
occur, many officers must be employed to conduct the interviews, so the system would be more 
expensive.  Since any exit tracking system must verify travelers’ identities, biographic systems require 
interviews.  Biometric systems, on the other hand, can be automated to save time and money.  These 
principles will play out differently at air and land ports of  entry.
Implementation at Airports
Implementing exit tracking will be easier at airports than at land borders.  Currently, DHS re-
ceives an electronic passenger manifest from airlines with information about each traveler, and uses 
this information to track exit in certain cases.  Therefore, there is already a serviceable biographic 
exit tracking system in place.  However, matching entry records to departure records is laborious, 
requiring complicated algorithms and manual review.105  Also, under the current system, airlines are 
99  8 U.S.C. § 1365b (2006).
100  Ctr. fOr immigr. Stud., the POlitiCS and PraCtiCalitieS Of exit COntrOlS: rePOrt frOm a Center fOr 
immigratiOn StudieS SYmPOSium 2 (Aug. 2010), available at http://www.cis.org/articles/2010/exit-panel.pdf.
101  Id.
102  Id. at 7.
103  Global Entry Trusted Traveler Network – About, u.S. CuStOmS & BOrder PrOteCtiOn, http://www.globalentry.
gov/about.html (last visited Jan. 5, 2013) (“At airports, program participants proceed to Global Entry kiosks, present 
their machine-readable passport or U.S. permanent resident card, place their fingertips on the scanner for fingerprint 
verification, and make a customs declaration.  The kiosk issues the traveler a transaction receipt and directs the traveler 
to baggage claim and the exit.”).
104  u.S. gOv’t aCCOuntaBilitY OffiCe, uS-viSit PrOgram faCeS StrategiC, OPeratiOnal, and teChnOlOgiCal 
ChallengeS at land POrtS Of entrY 4 (Dec. 2006).
105  Visa Overstays: Can They Be Eliminated?: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Homeland Security, 112th Cong. 
4-5 (2010) (statement of  Rand Beers, Under Secretary, National Protection and Programs Directorate, Department of  
Homeland Security).
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responsible for verifying the identity of  the traveler.  Since immigration enforcement is not a pri-
mary goal of  airlines, it is unclear whether this suffices for enforcement purposes.
The 2009 exit tracking pilot program showed two possible configurations of  an exit program at 
airports.106  The first involved TSA adding a layer to its pre-flight security screening process, and the 
other involved CBP processing travelers at the gate.  The TSA approach is superior because it would 
allow piggybacking on current infrastructure with only minor changes, whereas CBP processing 
passengers at the gate would require much new infrastructure and personnel.  The TSA approach 
requires only a very small change to TSA procedure.  Currently, passengers must present their tickets 
and photo IDs to TSA, and TSA must verify travelers’ identities.  Exit tracking would only require 
two small changes: that TSA scan the ID into a computer, and that the ID provide sufficient infor-
mation for immigration enforcement purposes.  Drivers licenses would not suffice because they usu-
ally do not state nationality.107  However, international travelers should already be carrying citizenship 
documents, so this would be no inconvenience to them.  The biographic, TSA approach requires 
only the installation of  document scanning computers at TSA checkpoints.
A second reason for preferring the TSA approach is that it would allow TSA to incorporate in-
telligence into its aviation security screening process,108 which would let it process passengers faster.  
Currently, intelligence partially informs TSA screenings, but only with the cooperation of  airlines.  
Intelligence informs TSA screenings in two ways.  First, when there is intelligence that a traveler is 
a security threat, TSA may put them on a “No fly” list and prevent them from traveling.109  Airlines 
are not supposed to sell tickets to such travelers.  Second, if  there is some adverse intelligence on a 
traveler but not enough to merit placing him on the “No fly” list, his name shows up in a database 
when he checks in.  The airline is supposed to mark the boarding pass so that the traveler receives 
additional screening.110  With exit tracking, TSA could take responsibility for these processes.  TSA 
officers could scan travel documents into computers, instantly receive any adverse intelligence, and 
subject the traveler to greater scrutiny if  there is adverse intelligence.  This takes the airlines out of  
the process of  incorporating intelligence into security screening, and rightfully so, since aviation se-
curity should be a government function.111  If  TSA had greater confidence that passengers known to 
be security threats would receive additional screening, it may enable TSA to give less scrutiny to the 
vast majority of  travelers who are not security risks.  An integrated exit tracking and aviation security 
106  u.S. deP’t Of hOmeland SeC., DHS Begins Test of Biometric Exit Procedures at Two U.S. Airports (last 
modified May 28, 2009), http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/releases/pr_1243605893203.shtm; u.S. gOv’t aCCOuntaBilitY 
OffiCe, uS-viSit PilOt evaluatiOnS Offer limited underStanding Of air exit OPtiOnS 25 (Aug. 2010).
107  For examples of  drivers licenses that do not state citizenship, see waSh. State deP’t Of liCenSing, Driver License 
Samples (2013), http://www.dol.wa.gov/driverslicense/licensesamples.html; tenn. deP’t Of SafetY & hOmeland SeC., 
Driver License Card Examples, http://www.tn.gov/safety/driverlicense/dlcards.shtml (last visited Jan. 5, 2013); and Or. 
driver & mOtOr vehiCle ServS. div., Sample Oregon Driver Licenses & ID Cards, http://www.oregon.gov/odot/dmv/
pages/driverid/samplecards.aspx (last visited Jan. 5, 2013).
108  Ctr. fOr immigr. Stud., the POlitiCS and PraCtiCalitieS Of exit COntrOlS: rePOrt frOm a Center fOr 
immigratiOn StudieS SYmPOSium 5-6 (Aug. 2010), available at http://www.cis.org/articles/2010/exit-panel.pdf.
109  Id. at 5.
110  Id. at 6.
111  Id.
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screening program may mean shorter TSA screenings for everyone.
There are two drawbacks to the TSA approach.  First, travelers may pass through the checkpoint 
and then not board their flights, so TSA would record them as leaving the country while they contin-
ued to stay.  This is not a problem, since failure to board the plane could be recorded in the passen-
ger manifest.  Some really nefarious traveler could go through the checkpoint and then switch board-
ing passes with a domestic traveler.  Some have proposed that the solution to this is to have airlines 
match boarding passes to travel documents again before boarding.112  However, this would impose 
unreasonable delays and administrative burdens on airlines.  Since the system need not record every 
single departure, there is an acceptably small risk that travelers may defraud the system in this way.
The second drawback to the TSA approach is that it is difficult to isolate international travelers.  
A single TSA checkpoint may screen both domestic and international passengers, so TSA officers 
would need some way to know whom they should inspect.  Placing a code or signal on boarding 
passes could solve this.  A related problem is that a traveler may take a domestic flight followed by 
an international flight.  For example, someone may fly from a small, regional airport in upstate New 
York to John F. Kennedy International Airport in New York City, and then catch a connecting flight 
to Paris.  Aviation security screening of  the passenger would occur at the small airport, and under 
current procedure, the passenger would not need to undergo security screening again in New York 
City.113  Therefore, exit processing would have to occur at the small, regional airport even though it 
has no international flights.  This means that all TSA checkpoints must be equipped for exit tracking, 
even checkpoints at airports without any international flights.  This increases costs significantly, but 
it may still be less expensive than the alternative: screening passengers at departure gates. 
Exit tracking at airports should be a biographic system, with TSA manually checking documents 
to verify identities.  This would only require the installation of  document scanning machines at TSA 
checkpoints and minor changes to current procedure.  However, these changes would have to be 
made at all TSA checkpoints, even those at airports without international flights.
Implementation at Land Borders114
The true challenge for exit tracking lies in implementing it at land borders.115  Land border exit 
tracking is daunting for four reasons: the high number of  border crossings, the current lack of  any 
inspection, spatial restrictions, and the diverse means of  conveyance for land traffic.  About one mil-
lion travelers enter the U.S. by land every day,116 and one may presume that a similar number depart.  
If  exit tracking causes even a slight delay for each traveler, it could grind border traffic to a halt very 
112  Id. at 8.
113  E.g., Sdreamer11, Comment to Connecting Flight Info, dream aCt POrtal fOrum (April 2, 2012, 1:33 PM), 
http://dreamact.info/forum/archive/index.php?t-26879.html (“I traveled las [sic] month and had a connecting flight 
and we did not have to go through TSA again, we just got off  one flight and went to our gate to wait for the next.”).
114  This paper will not consider implementation at seaports, because there is less information available about seaports 
and seaports only account for 3.5% of  all border crossings.  u.S. gOv’t aCCOuntaBilitY OffiCe, uS-viSit PrOgram 
faCeS StrategiC, OPeratiOnal, and teChnOlOgiCal ChallengeS at land POrtS Of entrY 16 (Dec. 2006).
115  Id. at 1.
116  In 2004, there were over 335 million land entries.  Id. at 16.
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quickly.  Currently, departing travelers are not inspected by U.S. authorities at all, so any new inspec-
tion would be a vast change.  There is also limited room for new infrastructure.  An aerial view of  
the border crossing checkpoint at San Ysidro, California demonstrates the spatial limitations:
117
While the entrance traffic is divided into 24 lanes to accommodate entry inspection (seen at the 
bottom of  the photo), the departure traffic is squeezed into only six lanes (top).  The facility is sur-
rounded by dense, urban infrastructure, leaving little room to expand.118  Departure traffic cannot be 
expanded into 24 lanes to accommodate exit inspection.119  The final challenge at land borders is that 
people cross on foot and in cars, trucks, vans, buses, and trains.  Exit tracking must accommodate all 
modes of  conveyance.  Managing all these challenges will be very expensive.
One of  the best solutions for these problems is to cooperate with our neighbors.  Canada is in-
terested in building a joint system that uses a single inspection both to track exit from the U.S. and to 
process travelers for entry to Canada.120  This is an excellent proposal, and it would solve the prob-
lem of  exit tracking on our northern land border.  However, this solution could only work because 
the U.S. has a good relationship with Canada on immigration issues.  For example, Canadian citizens 
enjoy easy, visa-free access to the U.S.,121 Canadians account for a very small portion of  the undocu-
mented population in the U.S.,122 and Canada is the only country with which the U.S. has a “Safe 
117  Id. at 40.
118  Id.
119  Id. at 39.
120  Ctr. fOr immigr. Stud., the POlitiCS and PraCtiCalitieS Of exit COntrOlS: rePOrt frOm a Center fOr 
immigratiOn StudieS SYmPOSium 9 (Aug. 2010), available at http://www.cis.org/articles/2010/exit-panel.pdf.
121  8 C.F.R. § 212.1(a)(1) (2012).
122  The Urban Institute estimates that 65,000 to 75,000 undocumented Canadian citizens live in the US, which is a 
very small portion of  the total undocumented population of  over 10 million.  Beth Slovic Balovic, Willamette Week, He’s 
an... Illegal Eh-lien, willamette week (Feb. 20, 2008), http://www.wweek.com/portland/article-8470-herss_an_illegal_
eh_lien.html.
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third country” agreement on asylum seekers.123  A joint system with Mexico may not work on the 
southern border because the U.S. has had a stormy relationship with Mexico on immigration issues.  
About 6.1 million undocumented Mexican citizens live in the U.S.,124 Mexican presidents have regu-
larly criticized U.S. immigration policy,125 and the U.S. is constructing a barrier along much of  the 
southern border.126  It may not be in the interest of  the Mexican government to assist the U.S. with 
tighter border controls.  The U.S. and Mexico may not have a strong enough relationship to conduct 
joint border inspections.  A different solution must be found for the southern border.
Current expectations for land exit tracking are unrealistic.  According to the Government Ac-
countability Office, lawmakers require exit tracking physically to match the traveler to the document 
he or she presents.127  The Government Accountability Office also says that officials consider it 
unacceptable to require vehicles to stop for exit tracking.128  These goals are incompatible with the 
technology currently available, and one must give way.  Since speed and volume are the main prob-
lems, automated biometric systems should be used wherever possible.
Vehicle traffic is the main concern.  First, vehicle traffic should be divided up into those subject 
to exit tracking and those not subject to it, to avoid subjecting U.S. citizens to needless delays.  Signs 
would direct U.S. citizens (and any others exempt from exit tracking, such as perhaps legal perma-
nent residents) to enter certain lanes and all others to enter certain other lanes.  A CBP officer could 
conduct cursory inspections of  the cars traveling in the U.S. citizen lanes, just to satisfy himself  that 
the cars indeed only contain U.S. citizens.  These stops could range from short, visual inspections to 
conversations, and the process would rely on the officer’s instincts to find suspicious travelers.  To 
add some integrity to this process, CBP could require the driver to have immigration documents 
for all passengers available for a quick glance by the officer, if  the officer desires.  As stated earlier, 
departing U.S. citizens should already be carrying immigration documents.  Most U.S. citizens (and 
others exempt from exit tracking) would only have to stop for a few seconds, if  at all.
In the lanes designated for exit tracking, an automated, biometric system could process cars 
rapidly.  Since many of  the vehicles are cars with very similar dimensions, an experiment should be 
conducted: have four fingerprint readers, one stationed at each passenger window.  The car could 
pull into position and then all passengers could roll down their windows and have their fingerprints 
taken simultaneously.  The fingerprint reading machine could also scan travel documents, if  the 
123  CitizenShiP and immigratiOn Canada, A Partnership for Protection: Year One Review (Nov. 13, 2006), http://www.cic.
gc.ca/english/department/laws-policy/partnership/chapter5.asp.
124  Associated Press, Illegal Mexican Immigrant Numbers Down as More Migrate Back to Mexico, CBSnewS.COm (April 23, 
2012, 4:00 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-201_162-57419334/illegal-mexican-immigrant-numbers-down-as-
more-migrate-back-to-mexico/.
125  Traci Carl, Mexico Blasts U.S. Immigration Policies, waSh. POSt (Sept. 2, 2007), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
wp-dyn/content/article/2007/09/02/AR2007090200958_pf.html.; Thelma Guerrero-Huston, In Portland, Fox Criticizes 
U.S. Policy on Mexico, StateSman J. (Salem, OR), March 20, 2008, at 1.
126  glOBalSeCuritY.Org, US-Mexico Border Fence / Great Wall of  Mexico Secure Fence (July 13, 2011), http://www.
globalsecurity.org/security/systems/mexico-wall.htm.
127  u.S. gOv’t aCCOuntaBilitY OffiCe, uS-viSit PrOgram faCeS StrategiC, OPeratiOnal, and teChnOlOgiCal 
ChallengeS at land POrtS Of entrY 52 (Dec. 2006).
128  Id. at 7.
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fingerprint alone is insufficient.  This experiment would still require an officer to verify visually that 
each passenger had given a fingerprint before the car moved on, so this system would not be com-
pletely automated.  However, it would save on labor since one officer could monitor several lanes 
simultaneously.  If  this experiment does not work, two choices remain, and neither option is good.  
First, an officer could take travel documents from everyone in the car, scan them in a machine, and 
visually verify the passengers’ identities.  This would be expensive since there would be one officer 
per lane of  travel, and it would also delay travelers while the officer scans documents and verifies 
identities.  The second option would be to use a biometric system that requires each passenger to get 
out of  the car.  This would be extremely messy and probably not viable, since it would require a safe 
place for the passengers to get out.  As mentioned previously, space at border checkpoints is often 
constrained.
Trucks, buses, vans, and other non-car vehicles have different dimensions than cars and would 
not be able to use the station with four fingerprint readers, so these vehicles should be filtered into 
yet another lane.  Since these vehicles have irregular shapes and differing numbers of  passengers, it 
would be difficult to automate the process.  Exit tracking for these vehicle types may require an of-
ficer to collect documents, scan them, and verify identity manually, in a setup similar to toll booths.
For trains, exit tracking could be done at the train station or conducted by a CBP officer on 
board.
Much land border traffic is pedestrian, and an automated solution for pedestrians would be 
fairly straightforward.  The system would function similar to a turnstile: one person would enter a 
constrained area, give a fingerprint and possibly also swipe a travel document, and then be released 
on the other side.  The constrained area could be a completely isolated booth similar to a telephone 
booth or it could be a partially constrained space similar to a subway turnstile.  The challenge here 
is making sure that only one traveler gets through for each fingerprint given.  The machine may be 
able to accomplish this alone, or one CBP officer could supervise all the turnstiles from an overhead 
vantage point.
To alleviate all the pressures that exit tracking would create at land borders, some types of  non-
citizens should be exempt from exit tracking.  First, legal permanent residents (“LPRs”) should be 
exempt.  The main goal of  exit tracking is to eliminate overstays, and LPRs are authorized to stay 
in the U.S. for as long as they like, so it is not possible for them to overstay.  The second popula-
tion which should possibly be exempted from exit tracking is holders of  Border Crossing Cards 
(“BCCs”).  These B1/B2 visa cards let travelers stay for a limited period and travel a limited dis-
tance from the border.129  BCC holders should possibly be exempted because they account for the 
vast majority of  nonimmigrant land admissions but do not overstay in great numbers.  Although a 
significant number of  BCC holders do overstay, their rate of  overstay is not very large relative to the 
129  COnSulate gen. Of the u.S., Ciudad Juarez, mex., Border Crossing Cards & B1/B2 Temporary Visitors for Business or 
Pleasure (last visited May 1, 2012), http://ciudadjuarez.usconsulate.gov/tourist_business.html.
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number of  border crossings they make.  According to the Pew Hispanic Center, in 2004 there were 
179 million nonimmigrant admissions and 148 million of  those were BCC holders.130  Although 
BCC holders account for the vast majority of  nonimmigrant border crossings, they account for a 
relatively small share of  the undocumented immigrant population: 250,000 to 500,000.131  Consider-
ing that this is the total stock of  unauthorized immigrants in the U.S. who entered with BCCs, a fair 
estimate is that about 50,000 BCC holders overstay annually.  The question is whether it is worth 
tracking 148 million departures just to stop 50,000 new overstays annually.  The answer may very 
well be no.  Exempting LPRs and BCC holders would alleviate the strain on exit tracking at land 
borders.  This means compromising the interest in immigration enforcement in favor of  the interest 
in freedom of  movement.
In summary, land borders present the main challenge of  exit tracking.  Any exit system has to 
accommodate many types of  traffic and operate quickly in constrained areas.  Since there is no exit 
inspection infrastructure currently in place, any new system will have to start from scratch and will 
cost a large amount of  money.  At the northern border, a joint system with Canada is essential.  At 
the southern border, vehicle traffic should be segregated depending on whether the passengers are 
subject to exit tracking.  Those subject to exit tracking should be further segregated into cars and all 
other traffic, since cars could potentially use a partially automated system.  Compared to the chal-
lenges presented by vehicular traffic, pedestrian traffic would be easy to track with an automated, 
biometric system.  LPRs and BCC holders should be exempt from exit tracking. 
vii. COnCluSiOn
Comprehensive exit tracking would be an important tool for reducing the population of  undoc-
umented immigrants in the United States.  Exit tracking is not a cost-effective counterterrorism tool, 
though it could serve both immigration enforcement and national security simultaneously.  Any new 
exit tracking system has to balance the four competing public interests in immigration enforcement, 
privacy, cost, and freedom of  movement.  Implementation is feasible at airports, where the best 
option is a program conducted by TSA.  Exit tracking could be implemented at the northern land 
border by conducting joint inspections with Canada.  On the southern land border, exit tracking will 
be very difficult to implement, it will cost a lot, and it will slow border traffic significantly.  Creative 
proposals for the southern border include segregating traffic, stationing four fingerprint pads around 
cars for simultaneous processing of  all passengers, and exempting legal permanent residents and 
holders of  border crossing cards from exit tracking.  If  it is necessary to exempt legal permanent 
residents and holders of  border crossing cards from exit tracking at the southern border, it means 
that a completely comprehensive exit tracking system is not currently feasible.
130  Pew hiSP. Ctr., faCt Sheet: mOdeS Of entrY fOr the unauthOrized migrant POPulatiOn 2 (May 22, 2006), 
available at http://pewhispanic.org/files/factsheets/19.pdf.
131  Id. at 1.
35Exit tracking
36 NATIONAL SECURITY LAW BRIEF Vol. 3, No. 1
